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ABSTRACT 
This article deals with WTO law as a possible obstacle to pursue CSR 
policies. Drawing in particular from the reports in Tuna Dolphin II and EC 
– Seal Products, it discusses the three main issues within WTO law related 
to the hybrid character of CSR regulation between private and public and 
between national and international: First, the general admissibility for the 
importing state to address socially and/or environmentally responsible 
production standards abroad and thus – from its perspective – 
extraterritorial situations (so-called ‘non-product-related production 
measures’); second, the attribution of (more or less) private CSR regulation 
to the importing state; and third, the question whether and under which 
conditions private (transnational) CSR standards can be regarded as 
‘international standards’ under the law of the WTO. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This article deals with the relation between ‘corporate social 
responsibility’ (CSR) regulation and the law of the WTO. CSR regulation 
has gained new momentum in the aftermath of the Rana Plaza collapse in 
Bangladesh and the fire in the Ali Enterprises factory in Pakistan, with 
academic discussion1 and pending litigation on corporate liability of 
multinational corporations or supply chain liability, for example, in 
Germany2 and Canada.3 At the same time, these disasters have led to new 
private CSR initiatives such as the so-called ‘Bangladesh Accord’4 but also 
to new public-private CSR governance structures such as (national and 
international) ‘CSR alliances’ like the German ‘Bündnis für nachhaltige 
Textilien’ (Alliance for sustainable garment).5 In fact, CSR regulation comes 
in a great variety of forms, including: purely private business self-
regulation; agreements between business and labour organisations or 
NGOs that have been adopted by certain or a considerable number of 
corporations nationally, EU-wide or internationally; private standards and 
labels, again nationally, EU-wide or internationally developed and/or 
adopted; and forms of public promotion of or state involvement in the 
setting of CSR standards like round tables for the development of CSR 
standards and labels, the adoption of legal minimum standards for 
                                                            
1 See, for example, C. van Dam, ‘Tort Law and Human Rights: Brothers in Arms’ (2011) 
2 Journal of European Tort Law 221; P. Rott and V. Ulfbeck, ‘Supply Chain Liability of 
Multilateral Corporations?’ (2015) European Review of Private Law 415. 
2 LG Dortmund, 7 O 95/15. For details, see P. Wesche and M. Saage-Maaß, ‘Holding 
Companies Liable for Human Rights Abuses Related to Foreign Subsidiaries and 
Suppliers before German Civil Courts: Lessons from Jabir and Others v KiK’ (2016) 16 
Human Rights Law Review 370. 
3 Das v. George Weston Limited, No. CV-15-526628 (Ont. Superior Ct. filed Apr. 22, 2015). 
4 Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, <http://bangladeshaccord.org> 
accessed 29 May 2017. 
5 <www.textilbuendnis.com/de> accessed 29 May 2017.  
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voluntary labels or state based voluntary labels, agreement based ‘CSR 
alliances’, and CSR standards in public procurement or in public support 
schemes. Other state based CSR mechanisms could be the mandatory use 
of certain certificates, mandatory product related minimum production 
requirements or CSR reporting duties. 
CSR regulation usually encompasses certain minimum production 
standards concerning environmental protection, human rights, labour and 
employment issues, health and safety issues, and bribery within the whole 
production chain. It is based on the idea that corporations are responsible 
for their impact on workers, the environment or neighbourhoods in 
situations or states with weak legal protection standards or weak 
enforcement mechanisms. Thus, CSR regulation is of particular 
importance with regard to transnational production chains where 
protection standards vary greatly between states. 
In turn, the law of the WTO, namely the GATT6 and the TBT 
Agreement,7 are concerned with the promotion of free trade through the 
obligation not to treat foreign products less favourable than ‘like products’ 
of national origin (‘national treatment’, Article III GATT) or less 
favourable than products originating from other countries (‘most favoured 
nation treatment’, Article I GATT), the prohibition of unnecessary 
restrictions to trade (Article XI GATT) and the requirement to base 
product regulation, labels and standards on international standards 
(Articles 2.4 and 2.5 TBT). Due to its regulatory impact on internationally 
traded products, their market access and competitive opportunities, CSR 
regulation is often thought to be in conflict with the law of the WTO; 
whereas it might also provide for international standards that national 
regulation can be based upon. 
Three main issues within WTO law related to the hybrid character 
of CSR regulation between private and public and between national and 
international can be identified: First, the general admissibility for the 
importing state to address socially and/or environmentally responsible 
production standards abroad and thus – from its perspective – 
extraterritorial situations (so-called ‘non-product-related production 
measures’); second, the attribution of (more or less) private CSR regulation 
to the importing state; and third, the question whether and under which 
conditions private (transnational) CSR standards can be regarded as 
‘international standards’ under the law of the WTO. 
All these aspects have been unsettled until now. This article first 
provides an overview of the long-standing discussions related to these 
aspects. It then analyses to what extent the two recent rulings of the WTO 
                                                            
6 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
7 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. 
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dispute settlement bodies in Tuna Dolphin II8 and EC – Seal Products,9 which 
deal not only with environmental but also with ethical concerns, further 
concretise the responsibility of the state for voluntary measures and the 
procedural fairness requirements for international standards, contribute to 
the solution of CSR related problems.  
2. SETTING THE SCENE: EXTRATERRITORIALITY – OR 
ADMISSIBILITY OF NON-PRODUCT-RELATED 
PRODUCTION REQUIREMENTS  
The extent to which the law of the WTO permits Members to take 
(regulatory) action dealing with situations beyond Member’s borders, has 
been discussed for long amongst WTO lawyers and Members. This 
discussion has also been led under the heading of the admissibility of so-
called ‘non-product-related process and production methods’ 
(‘nprPPMs’), which might negatively restrict importation or marketing 
chances of goods produced abroad. NprPPMs mean production 
requirements for certain products which cannot be traced in the physical 
characteristics of the product itself, for example, environmental, labour or 
health and safety standards for production processes.  
Proponents of the admissibility of CSR regulation and production 
related standards argue that they are an important means to socially embed 
transnational markets, which can bridge the boundaries of state based 
law.10 Their argument is that transnational trade is inevitably linked to the 
issue of exploitation of the environment and vulnerable parts of the 
population. The WTO Members should take reasonable measures to 
encourage corporations to pursue CSR objectives and/or adopt related 
standards. Without the possibility to link trade policies with production 
standards, in particular where internationally accepted minimum standards 
exist, the WTO would undermine social and environmental protection in 
the international arena and would put its own legitimacy at risk.11 
                                                            
8 US – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, 
WT/DS/381/AB/R (hereinafter: Tuna Dolphin II). 
9 EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, 
WT/DS/400/AB/R, WT/DS 401/AB/R (hereinafter: EC– Seal Products) 
10 See e.g. the UN Framework (John Ruggie, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework 
for Business and Human Rights’, UN doc. A/HRC/8/5 of 7/4/2008), and the Guiding 
Principles for Business and Human Rights (John Ruggie, ‘Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” 
Framework’, UN doc. A/HRC/17/31 of 31/3/2011) which are based upon the idea to 
embed global liberalism, prominently developed by K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation 
(Farrar and Rinehart, New York, 1944). See also J. Ruggie, ‘Taking Embedded Liberalism 
Global: The Corporate Connection’, in D. Held and M. Koenig-Archiburgi (eds), Taming 
Globalization: Frontiers of Governance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) 93. 
11 See e.g. S. Bernstein and E. Hannah, ‘Non-State Global Standard Setting and the WTO: 
Legitimacy and the Need for Regulatory Space’ (2008) 11 Journal of International 
Economic Law 575; C. Vidal-Léon, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility, Human Rights and 
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Opponents of production related requirements argue that they 
would produce external effects on the territory of the exporting states and 
interfere with their sovereignty, in particular when imposed unilaterally by 
the importing state. Thus, they could be regarded as coercion or 
imperialism or at least as paternalism to the detriment of comparative 
(cost-price) advantages of developing countries which impose additional 
costs upon poor producers and which thus constitute disguised 
protectionist or discriminatory practices. This position is particularly 
prominent amongst developing countries and has gained much attention 
in relation to environmental standards and environmental labelling.12 
Furthermore, developing countries are strictly opposed to link trade and 
(core) labour standards, arguing that they are intrinsically linked to 
(disguised) protectionist practices.13 
Again, proponents argue that, strictly speaking, production 
requirements do not regulate extraterritorial situations as such but only 
requirements for products to be brought into the importing state and thus 
a domestic issue. CSR standards address rules for the importer’s own 
behaviour and the issue of contributing to or benefitting from production 
practices regarded as immoral, socially inacceptable or detrimental to the 
environment via one’s own consumption. Also, regarding economic 
effects abroad, there is said to be no principal difference to product 
requirements.14 
Proponents of CSR regulation base their arguments on the fact that 
a distinction between product or production related measures has no 
founding in the wording of the GATT and the fact that there is no adopted 
ruling of a dispute settlement body concerning CSR related production 
methods to the contrary. Opponents of production based regulation base 
their legal arguments on early case law like the (never adopted) Panel 
                                                            
the World Trade Organisation’ (2013) 16 Journal of International Economic Law 893, 
with further references. 
12 See in particular, M. Joshi, ‘Are Eco-Labels Consistent with World Trade Organization 
Agreements?’ (2004) 38 Journal of World Trade 69, at 72, who refers, among others, to 
a study of the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment on discriminatory effects of 
environmental labelling. See also Vidal-Léon (n. 11), at 899 ff., who refers to several 
studies on the effects of CSR codes of conduct on international trade. 
13 See e.g. Vidal-Léon (n. 11), at 898 ff. with further references; M. Du, ‘Permitting Moral 
Imperialism? The Public Morals Exception to Free Trade at the Bar of the World Trade 
Organisation’ (2016) 50 Journal of World Trade 675, at 694 ff. 
14 See, e.g., R. Howse and D. Regan, ‘The Product/Process Distinction – An Illusory 
Basis for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy’ (2000) 11 European Journal of 
International Law 249, at 269 ff., who for the latter explicitly refer to environmental 
standards as opposed to labour standards which are more likely to be protectionist, 
except for those based on generally accepted core minimum requirements like the ILO 
core conventions. 
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decisions in Tuna Dolphin I15 where the Panel argued that a distinction 
between dolphin-friendly and dolphin-unfriendly caught tuna constituted 
discrimination.16 
In legal terms, this dispute relates to the legal character of the WTO 
and to the question whether WTO agreements, namely the GATT and the 
TBT Agreement, only create a negative right of States not to be 
discriminated against by differentiating products on the basis of their 
national origin, or whether they create a general positive right of market 
access which can only be denied for certain codified or accepted reasons.17  
Doctrinally, this dispute affects the interpretation, in particular, of 
Articles III:4 and XX GATT, and the applicability and interpretation of 
the TBT Agreement; which we turn to hereinafter. 
2.1. NON-DISCRIMINATION UNDER GATT 
2.1.1. ARTICLE III:4 GATT 
(a) The discussion 
Article III:4 GATT requires imported products to be treated ‘no less 
favourable than … like products of national origin in respect of all laws, 
regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale …’.18 This 
requirement has been interpreted not only as a prohibition of 
discrimination on the basis of the national origin of the product (de jure 
discrimination) but also as encompassing de facto discrimination, which 
results from origin-neutral requirements.19 This translates into the 
question whether physically identical products have to be considered as 
‘like products’ or may be considered as ‘unlike’ on the basis of differences 
in the way they were produced. Or, if they are regarded as like products, 
the question would be to what extent reduced competitive opportunities 
of imported products due to origin-neutral production requirements 
necessarily lead to legally relevant de facto discrimination. Authors have 
suggested that the question of likeness should not be decided by physical 
identity but by the ordinary legal approach as to whether a product differs 
in a relevant respect that justifies different treatment in a non-protectionist 
regulatory policy.20 
                                                            
15 US – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (1991) 30 ILM 1594; US – Restrictions on Imports of 
Tuna (1994) 33 ILM 936 (not adopted). 
16 See infra, 2.1.1. 
17 For an encompassing analysis, see Howse and Regan (n. 14), at 269 ff., 276; See also S. 
Charnovitz, ‘The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of 
Illegality’ (2002) 27 Yale Journal of International Law 59. 
18 Similar requirements are imposed by the ‘Most Favoured Nation’ treatment standard 
in Article I:1 GATT in relation to products originating from any other country. 
19 See, e.g., L. Ehring, ‘De Facto Discrimination in World Trade Law: National and Most-
Favoured Nation Treatment’ (2002) 36 Journal of World Trade 921. 
20 See in particular Howse and Regan (n. 14), at 261 f. 
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In contrast, early decisions by the GATT and WTO dispute 
settlement bodies, such as the Panel decisions in Tuna Dolphin I21 where 
the panel ruled that a distinction between dolphin-friendly and dolphin-
unfriendly caught tuna constitutes a discrimination amongst like products 
as well as a few other early rulings, however unrelated to CSR policies, 
such as US – Malt Beverages22 where the panel considered beer produced by 
large breweries not unlike beer produced by small breweries; US – Taxes 
on Automobiles23 where a fleet averaging method was regarded as not 
relating to the product (car) but to the producer; US – Gasoline24 where the 
panel held that it was not admissible to differ on the basis of characteristics 
of the producer and the nature of the data held by it; suggested that a 
regulatory distinction on the basis of production or producer 
characteristics would be inadmissible.  
Instead, since Japan – Alcoholic Beverages,25 the Appellate Body 
emphasised a competition-focused determination of whether products are 
‘like’ which is based on ‘four categories of “characteristics” that the 
products involved might share: (i) the physical properties of the products; 
(ii) the extent to which the products are capable of serving the same or 
similar end-uses; (iii) the extent to which consumers perceive and treat the 
products as alternative means of performing particular functions in order 
to satisfy a particular want or demand; and (iv) the international 
classification of the products for tariff purposes’, and on the question 
whether the measure modifies the conditions of competition to the 
detriment of imported ‘like’ products in order to establish de facto 
discrimination. In this approach the potentially legitimate and non-
protectionist objective of a regulation, be it product or production related, 
was of no relevance at all.  
This strict competition-based approach, however, was opened up to 
some extent in subsequent rulings such as EC – Asbestos: Here, the 
Appellate Body held that although the ‘determination of “likeness” under 
Article III:4 is, fundamentally, a determination about the nature and extent 
of a competitive relationship between and among products,’26 significant 
health risks (of building materials containing asbestos as opposed to other 
building materials) could be of relevance for two of the criteria, namely 
for differences in the physical characteristics of the product and for 
differences in consumer preferences. Thus, they might not be ‘like’ one 
                                                            
21 n. 15. 
22 US – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, BISD 39 (1992) 206. 
23 US – Taxes on Automobiles (1994) 33 ILM 1397 (not adopted). 
24 US – Standards for reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R. 
25 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, 
WT/DS11/AB/R, paras 19 ff. 
26 European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, 
WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 99. 
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another although they compete on the same market.27 The Appellate Body 
further held that in case products have been determined to be like 
products, this does not necessarily imply that Members may not draw any 
regulatory distinctions.28 In Thailand – Cigarettes, the Appellate Body 
further clarified that there must be a ‘genuine relationship’ between the 
measure at issue ‘and its adverse impact on competitive opportunities for 
imported versus like domestic products to support a finding that imported 
products are treated less favourably’.29  
Nevertheless, it remained unclear from these decisions whether and 
under what conditions de facto discrimination of a competition modifying 
measure could indeed be excluded on the basis of legitimate regulatory 
intent and whether this could also apply to production related 
requirements.30 This question was of particular relevance for the potential 
application of US – Clove Cigarettes,31 which applied a two steps inquiry in 
order to define de facto discrimination under Article 2.1 TBT Agreement; a 
provision which requires, in addition to the question whether the measure 
modifies the conditions of competition, also the finding that the 
detrimental impact on competitive opportunities indeed reflects 
discrimination.32 
 
                                                            
27 EC – Asbestos, WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 113. Although ‘[t]he kind of evidence to be 
examined in assessing the 'likeness' of products will, necessarily, depend upon the 
particular products and the legal provision at issue. When all the relevant evidence has 
been examined, panels must determine whether that evidence, as a whole, indicates that 
the products in question are 'like' in terms of the legal provision at issue.’; ibid., paras 
101–103. 
28 In EC – Asbestos, WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 100, the Appellate Body found that a 
Member may draw distinctions between products which have been found to be 'like', 
without, for this reason alone, according to the group of 'like' imported products 'less 
favourable treatment' than that accorded to the group of 'like' domestic products. 
29 Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines, 
WT/DS/371/AB/R, para. 134. 
30 In favour of the relevance of the regulatory intent: Howse and Regan (n. 14); sceptical 
Charnovitz (n. 17), at 91. 
31 US – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS/406/AB/R, 
paras 161 ff. 
32 See R. Howse, J. Langille, K. Sykes, ‘Pluralism in Practice: Moral Legislation and the 
Law of the WTO after Seal Products’ (2015) New York University School of Law, Public 
Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 15-05, April 2015, 81, 
at 126 ff.; see also R. Howse, J. Langille and K. Sykes, ‘Sealing the Deal: The WTO’s 
Appellate Body Report in EC – Seal Products’ (2014) 18(12) American Society of 
International Law;  <www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/12/sealing-deal-
wto%E2%80%99s-appellate-body-report-ec-%E2%80%93-seal-products> accessed 1 
September 2017.  For the TBT Agreement, see infra, 2.2.2. 
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(b) The impact of EC – Seal Products 
EC – Seal Products33 concerned a European importation and 
marketing ban on seals products, motivated by European moral concerns 
about seal killing (methods) but accompanied by an exception for 
indigenous subsistence hunting.34 In fact, this ban affected the vast 
majority of Canadian and Norwegian seal products, which derive from 
commercial hunting, whereas the European (indigenous Greenlandic) seal 
products fell under the exception. Thus, the Appellate Body had to deal 
exactly with the question in how far (a distinction based on) a legitimate 
regulatory intent might exclude discrimination in the terms of Articles I:1 
and III:4 GATT, and whether a production related restriction could be 
regarded as informed by a legitimate regulatory intent. The Appellate 
Body, however, held that the decisive question was solely whether the 
measure had a detrimental impact on competitive opportunities of 
imported products. The relevance of the regulatory intent was rejected as 
there was no basis for the latter in the wording of Article III.4.35 
Consequently, the fact that the measure impacted far more on Canadian 
and Norwegian seal products than on European products was regarded as 
sufficient to establish less favourable treatment in terms of Article III:4.36 
As a consequence, any change in the competitive relations to the 
disadvantage of (certain) imported ‘like products’37 which is caused by a 
governmental measure could be regarded as de facto discrimination in terms 
of Article III:4, no matter how legitimate the governance issue.38 A 
discriminating measure could only be justified under Article XX if it was 
necessary to pursue one of the listed legitimate policy objectives. Actually, 
it has been doubted that the Appellate Body really meant to take such a 
rigorous stance, as this would mean that very many legislative measures by 
WTO Members would be prima facie illegal under WTO law; an outcome 
which has been regarded to be ‘extreme and hard to reconcile with the 
intent and text of GATT’.39 
 
                                                            
33 EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, 
WT/DS/400/AB/R, WT/DS 401/AB/R. 
34 On the background and the relevant EU law, see J. Beqiraj, ‘The Delicate Equilibrium 
of EU Trade Measures: The Seals Case’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal 279. 
35 EC – Seal Products, WT/DS/400/AB/R, WT/DS 401/AB/R, para. 5.90. 
36 ibid., paras 5.94, 5.105, 5.110. 
37 The question of ‘likeness’ was not discussed in EC – Seal Products. 
38 EC – Seal Products, WT/DS/400/AB/R, WT/DS 401/AB/R, para. 5.125. For detailed 
analysis, see Howse, Langille and Sykes, ‘Pluralism in Practice’ (n. 32), at 127 ff. 
39 See Howse, Langille and Sykes, ‘Sealing the Deal’ (n. 32). For detailed analysis, see 
Howse, Langille and Sykes, ‘Pluralism in Practice’ (n. 32), at 132 ff., 146. 
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2.1.2. ARTICLE XX GATT 
(a) The discussion 
With this rigorous approach to Article III.4 GATT, Article XX 
GATT is conferred upon the role of protecting policy space for legitimate 
regulatory measures. Under Article XX GATT, a potential infringement 
of Article III:4 GATT – and also of Article XI GATT which prohibits 
(quantitative) trade restrictions - evoked by a (production related) CSR 
measure can be justified in case it is necessary to pursue legitimate policy 
objectives such as (a) the protection of public morals, (b) the protection 
of human, animal or plant life or health or (g) relate to the conservation 
of exhaustible natural resources. Here again, the question whether these 
policy objectives can also be related to activities or situations outside the 
importing State’s territory has been the subject of a controversial debate. 
Opponents of an extraterritorial application in particular of Article XX(a) 
and (b) still base their opinion on the early Tuna Dolphin I rulings where 
the panel held that Article XX(b) does not cover extra-territorial measures 
such as the protection of dolphins outside US territory. 
Proponents of the admissibility of CSR regulation related to 
situations abroad, invoke in particular US - Shrimp-Turtle40 where the 
Appellate Body regarded the US importation requirement that shrimps 
have to be harvested under conditions that do not adversely affect sea 
turtles (an endangered species) to be justified under Article XX(g) as long 
as good faith efforts were undertaken with a view to the adoption of an 
international standard in this regard. The Appellate Body stated that it 
would not ‘pass upon the question of whether there is an implied 
jurisdictional limitation in Article XX(g), and if so, the nature or extent of 
that limitation’ as in the specific circumstances of that case, there was ‘a 
sufficient nexus between the migratory and endangered marine 
populations involved and the United States for purposes of Article 
XX(g)’.41 Thus, as the Appellate Body referred to the fact that the 
protected turtles also traversed US waters, strictly speaking, the ruling did 
not concern a (purely) extraterritorial issue.42 Moreover, the protection of 
exhaustible resources under Article XX(g) has generally been interpreted 
as less restrictive than the other justifications.43  
As the very idea of the US measure was the preservation of an 
endangered species as such and not of domestic turtles, this decision has 
nevertheless been interpreted as permitting extraterritorial production 
measures at least as far as environmental protection is concerned; which 
has been regarded as being in line with the fact that environmental 
degradation or pollution is a globally interrelated and transboundary 
                                                            
40 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R. 
41 ibid., para. 133. 
42 For detailed analysis of case law and discussions, see in particular Charnovitz (n. 17), 
at 92 ff., 99 ff. See also Howse and Regan (n. 14). 
43 See Charnovitz (n. 17), at 92 ff. 
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issue.44 In contrast, the potential justification of CSR standards relating to 
purely domestic health and safety issues or the protection of human and 
labour rights under Article XX (a) or (b) remained contested.45 
(b) The Impact of EC-Seal Products 
In EC - Seal Products, the European Union initially justified the 
importation and marketing ban on seals products with public concerns 
about seal killing (methods) under Article XX(a) and (b). The Appellate 
Body, however, considered only Article XX(a). It upheld the Panel’s 
finding that the EU regulation was necessary to protect public morals 
within the meaning of Article XX(a) although the public morals were 
(also) concerned with the protection of extraterritorial seals. With regard 
to the exterritorial issue, the Appellate Body held that ‘[a]s set out in the 
preamble of the Basic Regulation, the EU Seal Regime is designed to 
address seal hunting activities occurring "within and outside the 
Community" and the seal welfare concerns of "citizens and consumers" 
in EU Member States. The participants did not address this issue in their 
submissions on appeal. Accordingly, while recognizing the systemic 
importance of the question of whether there is an implied jurisdictional 
limitation in Article XX(a), and, if so, the nature or extent of that 
limitation, we have decided in this case not to examine this question 
further.’46 
The general approach towards Article XX(a) is first, to examine 
whether the objective of the measure falls within the scope of protection 
of public morals and second, whether it is necessary, which includes a 
weighing and balancing of the relative importance of the interests at stake, 
the contribution of the measure to meeting the objective, and the trade 
restrictive impact of the measure; also, alternative measures to achieve the 
same objective are analysed. 
With regard to the highly contested issue whether the European ban 
falls within the scope of public morals (and prevents harm to European 
citizens), the Panel had held that ‘Members should be given some scope 
to define and apply for themselves the concepts of “public morals” in their 
respective territories, according to their own systems and scales of values. 
… [W]e are nevertheless persuaded that … animal welfare is an issue of 
ethical or moral nature in the European Union. International doctrines 
and measures of a similar nature in other WTO Members … illustrate that 
animal welfare is a matter of ethical responsibility for human beings in 
general.’47 This wide interpretation of public morals was upheld by the 
Appellate Body: ‘Members have the right to determine the level of 
protection that they consider appropriate. … Members may set different 
                                                            
44 See Howse, Langille and Syke, ‘Pluralism in Practice’ (n. 32), 124 ff. 
45 On these, see MJ Trebilcock and R Howse, ‘Trade Policy & Labour Standards’ (2004-
2005) 14 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 261. 
46 EC – Seal Products, WT/DS/400/AB/R, WT/DS 401/AB/R, para 5.173. 
47 EC – Seal Products, WT/DS/400/R, WT/DS 401/R, para. 7.409. 
CSR AND THE LAW OF THE WTO 132 
levels of protection even when responding to similar interests of moral 
concern … [W]e do not consider that the European Union was required 
by Article XX(a), as Canada suggests, to address such public moral 
concerns [slaughterhouses and terrestrial wildlife hunts] in the same way.’48 
Thus, the Appellate Body was convinced ‘that the principal objective of 
the EU Seal Regime is to address EU public moral concerns regarding seal 
welfare, while accommodating IC [indigenous communities] and other 
interests so as to mitigate the impact of the measure on those interests.’49 
The Panel – upheld by the Appellate Body - also regarded the highly 
trade restrictive importation and marketing ban as necessary, due to the 
consideration that the protection of public morals is of highest importance 
and that ‘[t]o the extent that such seal products are prohibited from the 
EU market, we find that the ban makes a material contribution to the 
objective of the measure’ ‘by reducing, to a certain extent, the global 
demand for seal products and by helping the EU public avoid being 
exposed to seal products … derived from seals killed inhumanely.’50 Also, 
potential alternative less trade restrictive measures, namely labelling 
requirements certifying compliance with animal welfare standards, had 
been dismissed as they would not effectively address the moral concerns 
and pose significant difficulties in terms of monitoring and compliance.51 
What remains is the so-called chapeau in Article XX, which provides 
for a safeguard that ‘such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade’ aims at ensuring that a trade restrictive 
measure which can invoke one of the exceptions is applied in ‘good faith’ 
and not misused for protectionist purposes. Often, the chapeau is used to 
address inconsistencies in the measure. In EC – Seal Products, the Appellate 
Body found inconsistencies with the exception of  indigenous hunts which 
it held to amount to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination and thus not 
to meet the requirements of the chapeau. In particular, the exception did 
not address animal welfare issues of indigenous hunts and did not 
safeguard sufficiently that no commercial hunts could fall under the 
exception. Moreover, access of Canadian Inuit to the exception should be 
facilitated.52 
(c) Public morals and human rights and labour standards 
Although EC – Seal Products dealt with animal welfare, its (potential) 
significance for CSR regulation, in particular human rights and labour 
standards, seems obvious. The relevance of the public moral exception in 
                                                            
48 EC – Seal Products, WT/DS/400/AB/R, WT/DS 401/AB/R, para. 5.200.  
49 ibid., para 5.167. 
50 EC – Seal Products, WT/DS/400/R, WT/DS 401/R, para. 7.637. 
51 ibid., paras 7.496 ff. For detailed analysis, see Howse, Langille and Sykes, ‘Pluralism in 
Practice’ (n. 32). 
52 EC – Seal Products, WT/DS/400/AB/R, WT/DS 401/AB/R, para. 5.337. 
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Article XX(a) for the protection of human rights and labour rights has 
always been highlighted by authors like Charnovitz who regarded 
internationally recognised human rights standards as a classical application 
of the concept,53 or Trebilcock and Howse who state that a ‘conception of 
public morals or morality that excluded notions of fundamental rights 
would simply be contrary to the ordinary contemporary meaning of the 
concept’ and that Article XX(a) should thus ‘extend to universal human 
rights, including labor rights’.54 This approach now seems, in principle, to 
be uncontested also with authors that are concerned about the trade 
restricting effect of CSR approaches: ‘If we agree that human rights are 
more important than animal welfare in our value scale, internationally 
recognized human rights norms and standards should definitely come 
within the scope of the “public morals”’.55 
Also, following EC – Seal Products, the extraterritoriality of protected 
subjects seems to no longer be an obstacle, at least for Article XX(a). 
Although the Appellate Body did not address this issue fundamentally, the 
fact that the measure aimed at the protection of moral concerns of 
European citizens and consumers was regarded as sufficient.56  
The challenge now relates to striking the balance between the 
protection of extraterritorial concerns and its misuse as a ‘catch all 
justification’ for concerns that are otherwise (potentially) not permitted57 
or for protectionist purposes.58  
Indeed, Article XX provides for legal safeguards against the misuse 
of alleged CSR aims for protectionist purposes, namely the necessity to 
provide evidence for the high national value of the particular CSR 
concern, the necessity of the measure, and the chapeau.59 Although EC – 
Seal Products dealt with a specific European concern which was neither 
established with reference to an internationally recognised standard nor 
                                                            
53 S. Charnovitz, ‘The Moral Exception in Trade Policy’ (1998) 38 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 689, 717 742. 
54 Trebilcock and Howse (n. 45), at 290. 
55 Du (n. 13), at 695. See also P. Serpin, ‘The Public Morals Exception after the WTO 
Seal Products Dispute: Has the Exception Swallowed the Rules?’ (2016) Columbia 
Business Law Review 217, at 245 ff. 
56 Para 5.173. For detailed analysis, see Howse, Langille and Sykes, ‘Pluralism in Practice’ 
(n. 32), at 124 et seq., who argue that the measure is exactly concerned about the conduct 
of EU citizens and consumers who do not want to create a market for cruelly killed seals 
or become accomplices to these practices. 
57 ‘[I]t is simply a shift from protecting foreign seals to EU citizens’ feelings about the 
seals’, see Du (n. 13), at 689. 
58 ‘[W]hy couldn’t the US government claim that the US citizens have legitimate moral 
concerns on gender equality in Saudi Arabia, human rights in Myanmar and labour 
standards in China?’, see Du (n. 13), at 695. 
59 See Serpin (n. 55). 
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necessarily consistent with (all) other animal treatment concerns,60 for 
establishing a legitimate CSR concern, it might be helpful to refer to 
internationally recognised human rights or core labour standards61 and to 
pursue a consistent policy in this regard. Similar considerations would, in 
principle, apply for compliance with the Chapeau. Here, it would be of 
particular relevance whether a CSR measure does not target specific 
countries, as opposed to other countries where similar conditions exist.62 
With  regard to the element of necessity, it is noteworthy that the Panel 
and the Appellate Body both did not regard a labelling requirement as an 
alternative, less restrictive instrument; and this was not only because of 
monitoring and verification problems but also because a mere labelling 
requirement would not effectively meet the relevant moral concerns.63 
2.2. THE TBT AGREEMENT 
2.2.1. THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION 
The TBT Agreement is applicable to ‘technical regulations’ and 
‘standards’. A technical regulation is defined as a ‘[d]ocument which lays 
down product characteristics or their related processes and production 
methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which 
compliance is mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with 
terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as 
they apply to a product, process or production method.’ As opposed to a 
technical regulation, compliance with a standard is voluntary.64 Art. 2.1 
TBT lays down most-favoured nation and national treatment 
requirements for like products that are, in principle, similar to those of the 
GATT.65 Article 2.2 TBT prohibits technical regulations from  being more 
trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective which 
includes the prevention of deceptive practices, the protection of human 
                                                            
60 See Howse, Langille and Sykes, ‘Pluralism in Practice’ (n. 32), at 114 ff., who argue that 
the Appellate Body did not require philosophical consistency with other moral concerns; 
at 117 ff., they also argue that the protection of public morals can less be addressed by 
international standards and principal and instrumental consistency. 
61 See also Charnovitz (n. 53), at 742. 
62 Trebilcock and Howse (n. 45), at 290; Howse, Langille and Sykes, ‘Pluralism in Practice’ 
(n. 32), at 117 ff. 
63 See supra, 2.1.2. (b).  
64 TBT Agreement, Annex I 1. A standard is defined in Annex I 2. as a ‘[d]ocument 
approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, 
guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and production methods, 
with which compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with 
terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a 
product, process or production method.’ 
65 See infra, 2.2.2., although the Appellate Body does regard the scope and content of 
these provisions not to be entirely identical, see e.g. Tuna Dolphin II, WT/DS381/AB/R, 
para. 405. 
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health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment. The list 
is non-exhaustive. For example, the Appellate Body has also accepted 
consumer protection and fair competition as legitimate objectives.66 
(a) The discussion 
Here, it had been discussed for long whether or not the TBT 
Agreement is applicable to (extraterritorial) production methods at all (or 
whether they fall under the GATT instead). The opponents of an inclusion 
of ‘nprPPMs’ into the TBT Agreement argued with the wording of Annex 
I 1., which refers to product characteristics or ‘their related’67 processes and 
production methods whereas ‘related’ was interpreted as traceable within 
the physical characteristics of the concrete product. A subsequent 
question was whether labelling requirements would also have to relate to 
the physical characteristics of the product, as the second sentence of 
Annex I 1. does not explicitly contain this reference.68  
(b) The impact of Tuna Dolphin II 
Tuna Dolphin II69 dealt with US provisions which only allow the use 
of a ‘dolphin-safe’ label or any other form of description as ‘dolphin-safe’ 
for tuna caught in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP) on the US 
market if dolphins are not intentionally chased, encircled or netted during 
an entire tuna fishing trip and if this is confirmed by an independent 
observer - thus with an extraterritorial fishing method. Neither the Panel 
nor the Appellate Body discussed a (potential) distinction between 
product related and non product related process and production methods 
at all. The Panel regarded the US labelling provisions as product related as 
they ‘apply to a product’ without even considering the fact that the label 
deals with ‘dolphin-safe’ fishing methods, which cannot be traced in the 
tuna (products).70 This finding remained uncontested. The Appellate Body 
even regarded the US regulation as more encompassing than a mere 
labelling requirement, because it laid down comprehensively the use of the 
term ‘dolphin-safe’, and thus as a technical regulation within the meaning 
of the first sentence in Annex I.1. - again without even mentioning a 
                                                            
66 See European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, para. 287. 
67 Emphasis added by the author. 
68 See e.g. Joshi (n. 12), at 74 f. with reference to the negotiation history of the agreement. 
See also S. Puth, WTO und Umwelt – Die Produkt-Prozess-Doktrin (Duncker & Humblot, 
2003), at 217 ff.; C. Tietje, ‘Voluntary Eco-Labelling Programmes and Questions of State 
Responsibility in the WTO/GATT Legal System’ (1995) 29(5) Journal of World Trade 
123, at 135. For deviating views see E. Vranes, Trade and the Environment, Fundamental Issues 
in International Law, WTO Law and Legal Theory (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009), 
at 319 ff., 342 ff.; C. Conrad, Process and Production Methods (PPMs) in WTO Law – Interfacing 
Trade and Social Goods (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011), at 385 ff. 
69 United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna 
Products, WT/DS381. 
70 Tuna Dolphin II, WT/DS381/R, paras 7.71 ff. 
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potentially required relation to the physical characteristics of the product.71 
It held that ‘the US measure prescribes in a broad and exhaustive manner 
the conditions that apply for making any assertion on a tuna product as to 
its "dolphin-safety", regardless of the manner in which that statement is 
made. As a consequence, the US measure covers the entire field of what 
"dolphin-safe" means in relation to tuna products. For these reasons, we 
find that the Panel did not err in characterizing the measure at issue as a 
"technical regulation" within the meaning of Annex 1.1 to the TBT 
Agreement.’72 Thus, according to that ruling, the TBT Agreement covers all 
(technical) product requirements, be they product related or production 
related.73 Accordingly, authors have already claimed the ‘end of the PPM 
distinction’.74 
2.2.2. DISCRIMINATION OF ‘LIKE PRODUCTS’ UNDER THE TBT 
AGREEMENT 
Similar considerations as under the GATT apply to the feasibility of 
a different treatment of ‘like products’ based upon different production 
methods under the TBT Agreement. As opposed to the latest ruling under 
the GATT in EC – Seal Products, however, the Appellate Body in Tuna 
Dolphin II followed the line of reasoning set up in US - Clove Cigarettes75 that 
it takes two steps to define de facto discrimination. In addition to the 
question whether the measure modifies the conditions of competition, it 
must be established that the detrimental impact on competitive 
opportunities reflects discrimination. The latter translates into the 
question whether the measure pursues legitimate objectives and could be 
regarded as ‘calibrated’ and ‘even-handed’.76 Again, the legitimacy of 
addressing fishing methods which adversely affect animals (dolphins) 
which are neither endangered nor present inside US territory was not 
questioned at all. However, the labelling requirement reduced competitive 
opportunities of Mexican tuna products considerably, because the 
Mexican fleet was still setting on dolphins in order to catch the tuna. The 
Panel had found that it was not the US measure as such, which made it 
impossible or difficult for Mexican tuna producers to comply with, but the 
persisting fishing and purchasing choices of the Mexican producers 
                                                            
71 Tuna Dolphin II, WT/DS381/AB/R, paras 190 ff. 
72 ibid., para 199. 
73 For detailed analysis, see R. Howse and M.A. Crowley, ‘Tuna-Dolphin II: a legal end 
economic analysis of the Appellate Body Report’ (2014) 13 World Trade Review 321, at 
325 ff. 
74 J. Pauwelyn, ‘Tuna: The End of the PPM distinction? The Rise of International 
Standards?’, <worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog> accessed 29 May 2017. 
75 US - Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS/406/AB/R, para 161 et seq. 
76 Tuna Dolphin II, WT/DS381/AB/R, para. 215: ‘whether that technical regulation is 
even-handed’, ‘panel must further analyse whether the detrimental impact on imports 
stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction rather than reflecting 
discrimination against the group of imported products.’ 
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themselves and thus it was ‘not persuaded that … the United States 
affords Mexican tuna products “less favourable treatment” than that 
afforded to tuna products originating in the United States or in any other 
country …’.77 The Appellate Body, however, did not regard the measure 
as even-handed, mainly due to the fact that the labelling requirements did 
not include comparable requirements for tuna caught outside the crucial 
maritime area where the tuna/dolphin gatherings occurred (Eastern 
Tropical Pacific).78  
Thus, as opposed to Article III:4 GATT, in principal, a 
governmental measure which leads to a change in competitive relations 
does not necessarily constitute an infringement of Article 2.1 TBT as long 
as it can be based upon a legitimate regulatory distinction and is applied in 
a ‘calibrated’ and ‘even-handed’ manner. To this end, it is legitimate to 
distinguish on the basis of production methods which are concerned with 
the protection of at least certain extraterritorial objects or subjects, such 
as animals. 
2.2.3. INTERIM CONCLUSION ON THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY ISSUE  
Both rulings, Tuna Dolphin II and EC – Seal Products, dealt with animal 
welfare. Nevertheless, they provided for some clarification of the 
admissibility of CSR production requirements, which could be 
summarised as follows: First, the WTO provides for no principal obstacle 
to a measure dealing with extraterritorial situations. Although there are 
doctrinal differences concerning the national treatment requirements in 
GATT and TBT, these differences are not related to the extraterritoriality 
of a measure, and the protection of extraterritorial animals has been 
regarded as a legitimate policy aim under both agreements, at least as long  
as it related to the sale of products on the domestic market of the 
regulating state. Second, the impact, at least of EC – Seal Products, is not 
delimited to animal welfare, as the same moral considerations all the more 
apply to human welfare as laid down in many human rights or core labour 
rights oriented CSR standards. Third, although the previous rulings 
justified extraterritorial production requirements ‘only’ with Articles 
XX(a) and (g) GATT and legitimate policy aims under the TBT 
Agreement, there is no reason not to extend this extraterritorial approach 
also to Article XX(b) GATT, which protects human, animal or plant life 
or health and which could be invoked for health and safety at workplace 
requirements. EC – Seal Products addressed moral perceptions about 
animal welfare, and Tuna Dolphin II animal welfare as such, while both 
                                                            
77 Tuna Dolphin II, WT/DS381/R, paras 7.319., 7.377., 7.375 and 7.378. 
78 Tuna Dolphin II, WT/DS381/AB/R, paras 228 ff., 282 ff. For critical analysis of the 
application of the evenhandedness test in this ruling, see in particular, Howse and 
Crowley (n. 73), 328 ff, who argue that in order for an origin neutral requirement to be 
not evenhanded it requires not a random effect on marketing shares but a regulatory 
specific obstacle for foreign products such as e.g. a requirement for a very specific 
technology.  
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species, seals and dolphins, were not endangered. Thus, the measures were 
not related to the protection of global exhaustible resources as mentioned 
in Article XX(g) GATT but simply protected the welfare of extraterritorial 
animals, which constitutes a classical Article XX(b) GATT situation. 
Thus, although there seem to be no more fundamental obstacles to 
the pursuance of CSR goals, they have to be drafted carefully in order not 
to be regarded as disguised protectionist measures (in particular under the 
chapeau of Article XX GATT). The devil will be in the details of the 
concrete case. 
3. ATTRIBUTION OF PRIVATE OR VOLUNTARY CSR 
MEASURES TO THE STATE 
3.1. THE DISCUSSION 
As mentioned above, most CSR measures, however, are not imposed 
upon corporations by compulsory state law requirements but range from 
purely private (self-)regulation to various forms of state incentives. The 
law of the WTO, however, is, in principle, concerned with trade restrictive 
measures of Member States, not of private actors. For example, the GATT 
speaks in Article III:1 and III:4 of ‘laws, regulations and requirements’ of 
a ‘contracting party’, and in Article XI of ‘measures’ by a ‘contracting 
party’ or of ‘governmental measures’. The TBT Agreement refers to 
‘technical regulations’ or ‘labelling requirements’.  
Nevertheless, one line of argument is based upon the observation 
that the de facto practice of private market actors can be as trade restrictive 
and as coercive as mandatory state law requirements. For example, it is 
argued that de facto adherence to a voluntary label could render the related 
voluntary requirements de facto mandatory and should thus be an issue of 
WTO law.79 
In fact, private activities have already been discussed under the 
umbrella of WTO law, however with regard to the question of what types 
of state involvement in private actions are necessary to trigger WTO rules. 
Both Panels in Japan – Restriction on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products80, 
which concerned a non-legally binding agricultural programme, and in 
Japan – Trade in Semiconductors,81 which concerned a voluntary export 
limiting scheme which private producers adhered to, found that a 
governmental ’measure’ in the terms of Article XI GATT encompasses 
more than a ‘law or regulation’. Also, both rulings focused on the 
effectiveness of the measure, not on its legal character. However, two 
criteria were set up in order for a private measure to be attributed to the 
State and thus to constitute a governmental measure: there have to be 
sufficient state incentives for the measure to take effect, and the measure 
                                                            
79 See e.g. Vidal-Léon (n. 11), at 898 ff. 
80 Japan – Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, BISD 35S/163 (1988). 
81 Japan – Trade in Semiconductors, BISD 35S/116 (1988). 
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has to be essentially dependant on government action or intervention.82 In 
EEC – Dessert Apples,83 the Panel regarded a privately administered apple 
marketing scheme, which had been established by an EEC regulation and 
the operation of which was based upon EEC decisions and public 
financing, as a governmental measure.84 Japan – Kodak/Fuji85 concerned a 
private self-regulatory code of conduct of the Japanese photographic film 
and paper industry which was accompanied by private enforcement 
councils and which impacted upon the competitive opportunities of US 
producers. The government was involved in the drafting of the code and 
approved the final code. The panel regarded this involvement as sufficient 
to qualify as a governmental measure, in particular, in order to prevent 
WTO disciplines to be circumvented through a Member’s delegation of 
quasi-governmental authority to private enforcement bodies.86 Korea – 
Beef87 concerned a Korean so-called ‘dual retail’ scheme which required 
retailers to choose between either selling domestic or selling foreign beef 
only. Although the decision of the private retailers on what to sell was 
completely voluntary, the Appellate Body held that ‘[t]he legal necessity of 
making a choice was, however, imposed by the [governmental] measure 
itself’.88 This ruling has also been confirmed by the Appellate Body in US 
– COOL89 dealing with origin labelling requirement.90 In Canada – 
Automobiles,91 the Appellate Body regarded a Canadian voluntary ‘value-
added content’ scheme which led to importation duty exceptions as 
mandatory. 
Within the field of CSR measures, the public-private, mandatory-
voluntary distinction has gained particular attention in the area of 
voluntary (eco-) labels. Here, one line of argument considers voluntary 
labels as a means of market-based self-regulation - regardless of whether 
the label is privately or publicly administered, at least as far as no concrete 
compliance incentives are included - which does not invoke WTO 
disciplines. Moreover, voluntary labels are considered as less trade 
restrictive than other measures which aim at the protection of legitimate 
                                                            
82 For detailed analysis, see R.J. Zedalis, ‘When do the Activities of Private Parties Trigger 
WTO Rules?’ (2007) 10 Journal of International Economic Law 335, at 340 ff. 
83 EEC – Restrictions on Imports of Dessert Apples-Complaint by Chile, GATT Doc. L/6491, 
36S/93 BISD (1990). 
84 See Zedalis (n. 82), at 343 ff. 
85 Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R. 
86 For detailed analysis, see Zedalis (n. 82), at 344 ff. 
87 Korea – Measures Affecting Import of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R and 
WT/DS169/AB/R. 
88 ibid., para 146.  
89 US – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements, WT/DS/384/AB/R, 
WT/DS/386/AB/R. 
90 ibid., para 291. 
91 Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS139/AB/R, 
WT/DS142/AB/R. 
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goals.92 Others argue that the de facto practice of private market actors can 
be as coercive as mandatory requirements.93 Thus, the de facto adherence 
to e.g. a voluntary label can render the respective voluntary requirements 
de facto mandatory. The situation becomes even more complicated when 
state measures provide for certain incentives to comply with a voluntary 
(labelling) requirement.94  
3.2. THE IMPACT OF TUNA DOLPHIN II: MANDATORY VS. VOLUNTARY 
Under the TBT Agreement, the full state responsibility for product 
or labelling requirements translates to the question whether compliance with 
these requirements is mandatory.95 Tuna Dolphin II dealt with mandatory 
minimum requirements for a voluntary ‘dolphin-safe’ label or any other 
voluntary ‘dolphin-safe’ description. Hitherto, the great majority of 
authors had categorised this type of regulation, which lays down 
(mandatory) requirements for a voluntary label, as voluntary.96 
The Panel, however, regarded the labelling requirement as 
mandatory. The Panel admitted that there was ‘a basic distinction between 
a "requirement", which refers to the conditions or criteria to be fulfilled in 
order to comply with a document, and the notion of "mandatory" 
requirement as a condition made compulsory by law.’97 Thus, the 
characterisation ‘must be based on considerations other than, or beyond, 
the mere fact that such document establishes criteria for the use of a 
certain label.’98 It then, however, focussed on the fact that ‘[i]n particular, 
the measures prescribe "in a negative form" […] that no tuna product may 
be labelled dolphin-safe or otherwise refer to dolphins […] if it does not 
meet the conditions set out in the measures, and thus impose a prohibition 
(‘in a binding and exclusive manner’ ‘subject to specific enforcement 
measures’99) on the offering for sale in the United States of tuna products 
                                                            
92 E.g. H.R. Trüeb, Umweltrecht in der WTO (Schulthess, 2001), 453. Joshi (n. 12), at 69 ff., 
sees no sufficient relation between a voluntary eco-label and a national measure – 
regardless of whether the label is privately or publicly administered. From Japan – Measures 
Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R, and Canada – Certain Measures Affecting 
the Automobile Industry, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, results that a relation 
between compliance with the label and a national benefit is necessary. 
93 See e.g. Vidal-Léon (n. 11), at 898 ff. 
94 For an overview of the discussion, see e.g. E. Vranes, ‘Climate Labelling and the WTO’ 
(2011) 2 European Yearbook of International Economic Law 205, at 207 f.; Joshi (n. 12), 
at 69 ff.; J. Pauwelyn, ‘Recent Books on Trade and Environment: GATT Phantoms Still 
Haunt the WTO’ (2004) 15(3) European Journal of International Law 575. 
95 See Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement. 
96 See, e.g., Vranes (n. 94), at 209 ff.; Joshi (n. 12), at 70 ff.; Puth (n. 68), at 40, 217; Trüeb 
(n. 92), at 448; Conrad (n. 68), at 382 ff. 
97 Tuna Dolphin II, WT/DS381/R, para VII.116. 
98 ibid., para VII.117. 
99 ibid., paras VII.127 ff. 
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bearing a label referring to dolphins and not meeting the requirements that 
they set out.’100 
Although the Appellate Body admitted that the fact of a (mandatory) 
‘requirement’ (for a voluntary label) does not in itself render a measure a 
technical regulation,101 it upheld the findings of the Panel with regard to 
the particular circumstances of the case, and especially to the fact that 
legislation by state authorities that contains specific enforcement 
mechanisms lays down exclusive requirements for the broad subject of 
dolphin safety.102 In detail, the Appellate Body considered ‘whether the 
measure consists of a law or a regulation enacted by a WTO Member, 
whether it prescribes or prohibits particular conduct, whether it sets out 
specific requirements that constitute the sole means of addressing a 
particular matter, and the nature of the matter addressed by the 
measure.’103 It held that ‘the US measure prescribes in a broad and 
exhaustive manner the conditions that apply for making any assertion on 
a tuna product as to its "dolphin-safety", regardless of the manner in which 
that statement is made. As a consequence, the US measure covers the 
entire field of what "dolphin-safe" means in relation to tuna products. For 
these reasons, we find that the Panel did not err in characterizing the 
measure at issue as a "technical regulation" within the meaning of Annex 
1.1 to the TBT Agreement.’104 
Thus, at least this type of exclusive and encompassing requirements 
for a specific subject addressed by a voluntary label or description laid 
down by state regulation can be regarded as a technical regulation for 
which the respective state is fully responsible, although this has been 
highly criticised in the literature.105  
                                                            
100 ibid., para. VII.131. 
101 Tuna Dolphin II, WT/DS381/AB/R, paras 187 f. 
102 ibid., paras 188 ff., 193. Hereby, the Appellate Body highlights the ruling in EC – 
Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, para. 176, that a regulation must apply to an identifiable 
product or group of products, it must lay down characteristics of the product, and 
‘compliance with the product characteristics must be mandatory’. According to the 
Appellate Body the situation in both cases is similar: Whereas in EC – Sardines other 
species of sardines could be marketed on the EC market, provided they are not called 
‘sardines’, here, tuna products could be marketed, provided they are not called ‘dolphin-
safe’ (!). On this see also the amicus curie submission by R. Howse, 
<www.worldtradelaw.net/amicus/howsetunaamicus.pdf> accessed 29 May 2017 , at 4 
ff., who highlights the point that it depends on the relevant ‘identifiable product’ if a 
regulation could be regarded as mandatory. In EC – Sardines, the relevant product was 
‘sardines’ whereas here the relevant product in Tuna Dolphin II was defined as ‘tuna’ or 
‘tuna products’, not as ‘dolphin-safe tuna’ (!). 
103 ibid., para. 188. 
104 ibid., para. 199. 
105 See e.g. Howse and Crowley (n. 73), at 324, who regard this characterization as a 
‘fundamentally erroneous finding’. 
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3.3. CONCLUSION  
From the above, a certain likelihood of CSR measures to be 
attributed to the state can be deduced. Mandatory production 
requirements for certain products, such as the turtle extruder in shrimp 
catching in US-Shrimps-Turtles, are clearly regarded to be state measures. 
This applies equally to potential CSR measures such as an importation and 
marketing ban for carpets knotted by children or garments not produced 
under certain minimum fire safety conditions. Although less intrusive, 
mandatory certification requirements, for example the requirement to put 
a label on carpets either declaring ‘knotted without child labour’ or 
‘knotted by children’ would also be regarded as compulsory and thus 
attributable to the state. The same should apply to reporting duties, such 
as those laid down in the new EU CSR Reporting Directive 
2014/95/EU,106 which require certain big companies to report on their 
CSR activities or to declare that they do not have any CSR policies in place, 
and which are also meant to inform and influence market actors. Other 
examples are sec. 1502 of the US Dodd Frank Act107 or the proposed EU 
Regulation on conflict minerals.108 This can be derived from Korea – Beef 
and US – COOL, which also dealt with the legal necessity to make a 
decision and to declare. 
Also, minimum requirements for voluntary certificates as a 
precondition for either support schemes, such as those laid down in the 
EU Renewable Energy Directive for biofuels109, or for public 
procurement, would likely be regarded as state based. Considerable 
financial support or public supply contracts, the conditions of which are 
codified in domestic legislation, could be regarded as ‘sufficient state 
incentives for the measure to take effect, and the measure to be essentially 
dependant on government action’ as referred to in Japan – Trade in 
Semiconductors and other decisions. Even without state incentives, 
encompassing mandatory minimum requirements for a certain type of 
voluntary label, thereby excluding alternative labels as in Tuna Dolphin II, 
evoke full state responsibility. 
In contrast, although it is not entirely clear, the reasoning in Tuna 
Dolphin II suggests that mandatory minimum requirements for a state 
based voluntary label which, however, do not exclude alternative labels, 
might not be regarded as (technical) regulation but merely as voluntary 
                                                            
106 Directive 2014/95/EU amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of 
non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups, [2014] 
OJ L 330/1. 
107 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 
108 Proposal for a Regulation setting up a Union system for supply chain due diligence 
self-certification of responsible importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and 
gold originating in conflict-affected and high-risk areas, COM(2014) 111 final. 
109 Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources 
[2009] OJ L 140/16. 
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standards. Furthermore, there is no indication in WTO dispute settlement 
reports of state responsibility for purely private standards, even if they 
create a de facto obstacle to trade.110 Similarly, the political promotion of 
voluntary CSR standards, the organisation of round tables with business 
representatives (and NGOs) in order to set up CSR standards and other 
assistance in the drafting or implementation of standards like national 
‘alliance for sustainable garment’ would not be characterised as state based 
as long as resulting private CSR schemes provide for no indication that 
they in fact constitute a delegation of quasi-governmental authority to 
private bodies and thereby try to circumvent state responsibility (as was 
the situation in EEC – Dessert Apples or Japan – Kodak/Fuji).111 In order to 
approach this distinction, Zedalis has suggested to refer to the general rules 
of state responsibility under public international law where state planning, 
direction and support or control are regarded to be necessary, thus a 
relatively high threshold.112 
Instead, voluntary standards would come under Article 4 of the TBT 
Agreement which requires Member States to ‘ensure that their central 
government standardizing bodies … take such reasonable measures as 
may be available to them to ensure that … non-governmental 
standardizing bodies within their territories … [accept and comply] with 
the Code of Good Practice’, that is, the Code of Good Practice for the 
Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards in Annex 3 to this 
Agreement. The Code of Good Practice, in principle, requires 
standardisation bodies to ensure that their standards do not create 
unnecessary obstacles to trade, treat products from one country no less 
favourable than others and, in particular, to base their standards on 
international standards as far as appropriate. With regard to transnational 
private CSR standardisation activities, however, it would seem difficult to 
attribute their activities to a particular state that might then be required to 
take reasonable measures to influence them.113 
4. CSR REGULATION AS ‘INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS’ 
Rather than being an obstacle to trade, private CSR regulation could 
in fact play a positive role in constituting ‘international standards’ under 
the TBT Agreement, which could justify national CSR approaches based 
upon these standards. The TBT Agreement aims at achieving international 
                                                            
110 Although it was argued that in situations where a small number of retailers account 
for a high proportion of market share ‘the distinction between private voluntary 
standards and mandatory ‘official’ or ‘public’ requirements can blur.’ See Private 
Standards and the SPS Agreement: Note by the Secretariat, Committee on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, 24 January 2007, G/SPS/GEN/756, para 9. 
111 See also Zedalis (n. 82), at 345 ff. 
112 Zedalis (n. 82), at 356 ff. 
113 See also Vidal-Léon (n. 11), at 903 ff., who has spotted this problem with a view to 
the drafting of technical regulations. 
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harmonisation of technical regulations including marking and labelling 
standards through the recognition of international standards. To this end, 
Article 2.4 requires Member States to base their technical regulation on 
international standards. Vice versa, those national measures that are based 
on an international standard are (rebuttably) justified as not being 
arbitrary, discriminatory or unnecessarily protective and thus in 
conformity with the TBT Agreement, Article 2.5 TBT. 
According to Annex 1, point 2 TBT a ‘standard’ is a ‘[d]ocument 
approved by a recognised body that provides, for common and repeated 
use, rules, guidelines and characteristics for products and related processes 
and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory. It may 
also include or deal exclusively with … labelling requirements as they apply 
to a product, process or production method’. A standard constitutes an 
international standard, when it is adopted by an international ‘[b]ody or 
system whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all 
Members’, Annex 1, point 4. A ‘standardizing body’ is defined as a ‘body 
that has recognised activities in standardization’.114 Therefore, an 
‘international standard’ has to be approved ‘by an “international 
standardizing body”, that is, a body that has recognised activities in 
standardization and whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of 
at least all Members.’115 Annex 3 of the TBT explains that its requirements 
are open for acceptance for all standardising bodies, be they governmental 
or non-governmental, local, national, regional or international. A non-
governmental body is defined as one ‘which has legal power to enforce a 
technical regulation’, Annex 1 point 8.116  
The TBT Committee’s Decision on Principles for the Development 
of International Standards (‘Committee Decision’)117 adds the procedure-
oriented principles of transparency, openness, impartiality and consensus, 
effectiveness, relevance and coherence, and of addressing the concerns of 
developing countries for the development of international standards.  
                                                            
114 ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991. 
115 Tuna Dolphin II, WT/DS381/AB/R, paras 349 ff, in particular at 359. Here, the 
Appellate Body also clarified that a ‘body’ (‘legal or administrative entity that has specific 
tasks or composition’ (ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991, 4.1)) is enough to enact an international 
standard; it is not necessary to have an ‘organization’ (‘body that is based on the 
membership of other bodies or individuals and has an established constitution and its 
own administration’ (ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991, 4.2)), ibid, at 351 ff. 
116 See also J. Pauwelyn, ‘Non-Traditional Patterns of Global Regulation: Is the WTO 
‘Missing the Boat’?’ in C. Joerges and E.-U. Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel 
Trade Governance and International Economic Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011) 199, at 
210. 
117 Decision of the Committee on Principles for the Development of International 
Standards, Guides and Recommendations with relation to Articles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of 
the Agreement, Second Triennial Review of the Operation and Implementation of the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Annex IV, G/TBT/9, 13 November 2000, 
Sec. A. 24-26. 
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4.1. THE DISCUSSION 
There is no doubt that private organisations, such as the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), can be international 
standardisation bodies. The question is, however, whether it is necessary 
for an international standardisation body to be composed of ‘national 
bodies’ or whether purely private stakeholder driven systems, which 
adhere to fair and inclusive procedures, could also be regarded as 
‘international bodies’.118 On the one hand, an organisation that is 
composed of national bodies guarantees far better the necessary 
international consensus, given that it is the national bodies which have to 
implement the international standards in their national norms. On the 
other, private CSR standards which have been directly negotiated in line 
with procedural fairness between the relevant interests – for example, 
industry, environmental protection and consumer interests including 
industry and civil society from developing countries – could reflect a more 
direct and inclusive consensus between the concerned different protection 
interests and could be more flexible with regard to local particularities.119 
Pauwelyn has characterised this conflict as ‘thin (state driven) consent’ vs. 
‘thick (stakeholder driven) consensus’.120 The principles of the Committee 
Decision have not solved the conflict as now delegations and a fair 
inclusive procedure are mentioned. 
Indeed, there is an increasing amount of encompassing private 
transnational CSR standard setting systems which systematically adjust 
their structure and procedures to the above mentioned requirements of 
the Annex to the TBT Agreement, such as the ‘Forest Stewardship 
Council’, the ‘Marine Stewardship Council’ or ‘Fair Trade’ labels.121 At the 
                                                            
118 For details of the discussion, see H. Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance: Product 
Standards in the Regulation of Integrated Markets (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2005), 185 ff. 
119 See, e.g., Schepel (n. 118), at 28, 35. See also E. Meidinger, ‘Multi-Interest Self-
Governance through Global Product Certification Programmes’ in O. Dilling, M. 
Herberg and G. Winter (eds), Responsible Business: Self-Governance and the Law in Transnational 
Economic Transactions (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2007) 259; K. Bizer, ‘Kooperative 
Umweltpolitik im internationalen Kontext – Global Law Making am Beispiel 
nachhaltiger Forstwirtschaft’ in B. Hansjürgens, W. Köck and G. Kneer (eds), Kooperative 
Umweltpolitik (Nomos 2003) 57 regarding the ‘Forest Stewardship Council’. 
120 See J. Pauwelyn, R. A. Wessel and J. Wouters, ‘Informal International Lawmaking: An 
Assessment and Template to keep it both Effective and Accountable’, in id. (eds), Informal 
International Lawmaking (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 500, at 524 ff. For 
procedural requirements in the ‘standardisation community’ see Schepel (n 118), at 101 
ff.; H. Schepel, ‘The Empire’s Drains: Sources of Legal Recognition of Private 
Standardisation under the TBT Agreement’ in C. Joerges and E.-U. Petersmann (eds), 
Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and International Economic Law (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2011) 397, at 399 f. 
121 See also Bernstein and Hannah (n. 11). 
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same time, increasingly, national CSR regulation refers to these 
programmes or to their contents.122 
4.2. THE IMPACT OF TUNA DOLPHIN II 
In US – Tuna Dolphin II, the Appellate Body rejected the Panel’s 
finding, that a dolphin-safe label set up by an international organisation, 
the ‘Interamerican Tropical Tuna Commission’, was the relevant 
‘international standard’ in terms of the TBT Agreement because it was not 
‘open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members.’123 A possible 
membership to that commission was based on the requirements of either 
having a coastline bordering the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP) or 
having vessels fishing for tuna in the ETP or being otherwise invited to 
join the agreement, and thus did not provide for the inclusion of 
(Members pursuing) other interests than fishing. Instead, the Appellate 
Body clarified that for a standardisation ‘body’ it is not necessary to have 
an ‘organization’- which is defined as a ‘body that is based on the 
membership of other bodies or individuals and has an established 
constitution and its own administration’124 - but the development of a 
single standard could be enough.125 It further emphasised the TBT 
Committee’s procedure-oriented principles of transparency, openness, 
impartiality and consensus, effectiveness, relevance and coherence, and of 
addressing the concerns of developing countries for the development of 
international standards126 and highlighted that standards development 
must ‘take place transparently and with wide participation’ of ‘all interested 
parties’ which also aims at stakeholders127 and ‘must not privilege any 
particular interests.’128 
This emphasis on (fair and inclusive) procedures where ‘all interested 
parties’ have the chance of giving input instead of on (state based) 
organisation can be regarded as a considerable step into the direction of 
recognition of private transnational CSR standards as ‘international 
standards’ in case they meet the relevant legitimacy requirements. Thus, 
                                                            
122 See Bernstein and Hannah (n. 11). In Bolivian law and Brazilian administrative 
practice, enterprises which have been certified by the ‘Forest Stewardship Council’ are 
assumed to manage their forests in in a sustainable way in accordance with the legal 
requirements. For Brazil, see C. Derani and J.A. Fontoura Costa, ‘State and Private Sector 
in a Cooperative Regulation: The Forest Stewardship Council and other Product Labels 
in Brazil’ in Dilling, Herberg and Winter (n. 119) 301; for Bolivia, see E. Meidinger, 
‘Forest Certification as Environmental Law Making by Global Civil Society’ in E. 
Meidinger, C. Elliott and G. Oesten (eds), Social and Political Dimensions of Forest Certification 
(Kessel, 2003) 315. For more details see Meidinger (n. 119), at 275 ff. 
123 Tuna Dolphin II, WT/DS/381/AB/R, para. 386. 
124 ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991, 4.2. 
125 Tuna Dolphin II, WT/DS/381/AB/R, paras 349 ff., in particular para 359. 
126 Committee Decision (n. 114), sec. A. 24-26. 
127 Tuna Dolphin II, WT/DS/381/AB/R, para. 379. 
128 ibid., para. 384. 
NJCL 2017/1 
 
147 
they can play an increasingly important role in defining whether or not a 
(national) concern is legitimate and whether or not a country has acted in 
a non-discriminatory manner.129 
5. CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS 
The two Appellate Body rulings in Tuna Dolphin II and EC – Seal 
Products provide for a complex and mixed picture as to the admissibility of 
CSR measures. On the one hand, in EC – Seal Products the Appellate Body 
applied a very broad concept of (de facto) discrimination, with the 
consequence that every CSR regulation which impacts negatively on the 
competitive opportunities of imported products would be regarded prima 
facie as an infringement of Article III:4 GATT, which would have to be 
justified under Article XX GATT. Thus, this decision supports a broad 
interpretation of WTO law as creating a general positive right of market 
access which can only be delimited for certain legitimate codified or 
accepted reasons, an opinion which is primarily pursued by opponents to 
CSR regulation. On the other hand, the pursuance of extraterritorial 
protection aims was accepted in both decisions as a legitimate policy goal 
under Article XX GATT and under the TBT Agreement without further 
discussion. The protection of domestic moral perceptions (EC – Seal 
Products) and the relation to domestically marketed products (Tuna Dolphin 
II) have been regarded as sufficient territorial nexus,130 an argument put 
forward by those who favour a narrow interpretation of WTO law, 
focusing on non-discrimination. 
Second, while the extraterritoriality of CSR protection aims is not a 
fundamental hurdle to their admissibility under WTO law, the devil is 
within the details, and CSR measures, in particular those which aim at the 
protection of health and safety and labour standards, will have to be 
drafted carefully in order to not constitute a protectionist and disguised 
discriminatory measure. 
Third, Tuna Dolphin II has extended state responsibility slightly by 
including mandatory legal requirements for the voluntary use of a label or 
declaration into the concept of technical regulations. However, there is no 
indication from the reasoning in Tuna Dolphin II or from other case law as 
                                                            
129 See also J. Pauwelyn, ‘Rule-Based Trade 2.0? The Rise of Informal Rules and 
International Standards and How they May Outcompete WTO Treaties’ (2014) 17 
Journal of International Economic Law 739, at 742 ff.; see further N. Hachez and J. 
Wouters, ‘A Glimpse at the democratic legitimacy of Private Standards: Assessing the 
Public Accountability of Global G.A.P.’ (2011) 14 Journal of International Economic 
Law 677; for extensive discussion, see C. Glinski, ‘Competing Transnational Regimes 
under WTO Law’ (2014) 30(78) Utrecht Journal of International and European Law 44. 
130 On a suggestion on how to balance these two approaches, in particular consumer 
preferences and producer needs, see I. Cheyne, Proportionality, Proximity and 
Environmental Labelling in WTO Law (2009) 12 Journal of International Economic Law 
927. 
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to whether states should be held responsible for purely private CSR 
measures - beyond those enshrined in Article 4 TBT that states should 
take reasonable and available measures to ensure that also voluntary 
standardisation activities within their territories are based upon 
international standards and do not create unnecessary or discriminatory 
obstacles to trade. 
Tuna Dolphin II has increased the likelihood for procedurally fair and 
inclusive (private) transnational CSR standards to be accepted as 
‘international standards’ under the law of the WTO. Those private 
standards would in turn legitimise national CSR measures based upon 
them. This option indeed seems to be an incentive for a variety of private 
or public-private CSR initiatives to adopt their standards in the required 
inclusive (in particular with regard to the needs of developing countries) 
and procedurally fair manner. Building upon this incentive also seems to 
be the way forward with regard to a non-protectionist social embedding 
of transnational markets instead of trying to discipline even private CSR 
decisions with state responsibility.131 
                                                            
131 In this direction, see also Bernstein and Hannah (n. 11). 
